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Legal Malpractice: Improper Representation
of Conflicting Interests
Marshall J. Nachbar*
The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exer-
cised, within the bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of
his client and free of compromising influences and loyalties.
Neither his personal interests, the interests of other clients,
nor the desires of third persons should be permitted to dilute
his loyalty to his client.'W HEN AN ATTORNEY, for whatever reason-sloth, over zealous con-
duct, or personal greed-represents a client without being
completely loyal to the client's interests there are several things that
may occur. The attorney may be subject to disciplinary or disbar-
ment proceedings.2 He may be disqualified from further representing
his client. 3 If the attorney's actions have resulted in damage to his
client the attorney may find himself the defendant in a malpractice
action.4 If the cause of the damage is alleged to be the result of
an attorney representing dual interests or improperly representing
adverse interests then the cause of action will be for representing
conflicting interests.5
Before proceeding to discuss the elements of a malpractice action
for representing conflicting interests and before describing some
actions by attorneys that may be considered as the improper repre-
sentation of adverse interests, there are some general facts about the
problem that should be mentioned. There are instances where an
attorney may legally and ethically represent adverse or conflicting
interests. 6 An attorney, once he has made a full disclosure of all the
facts concerning the dual representation to the parties involved and
has obtained their permission to continue the representation of both
of them, may do so.7 In fact it has been held that the "general rule
that an attorney may not at the same time represent parties whose
interests conflict is subject to an exception, where he so acts with
*B.A., New York University; third-year student at Cleveland State University College
of Law.
I ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ECS-1 (1970).
2 Broderick's Case, 104 N.H. 175, 181 A.2d 647 (1962); Toledo Bar Ass'n. v. Miller,
22 Ohio St. Zd 7, 257 N.E. 2d 376 (1970) ; Columbus Bar Ass'n. v. Grelle, 14 Ohio
St. 2d 208, 237 N.E.2d 298 (1968).
3 Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Cir. Mgt. Corp., 216 F.2d 920 (2d Cir
1954) ; Wucthumna Water Co. v. Bailey, 216 Cal. 564, 15 P.2d 505 (1932); Wilson
v. Wahl, 182 Kan. 532, 322 P.2d 804 (1958) ; Brasseaux v. Girouard, 214 So.2d 401
(La. Ct. App. 1968).
4 Theobald v. Byers, 193 Cal. App. 2d 147, 13 Cal. Rptr. 864 (1961.
5 Lysick v. Walcom, 251 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968) ; Ishmael v. Mil-
lington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966) ; Olitkowski v. St. Casimir's
Say. & Loan Ass'n., 302 Mich. 303, 4 N.W.2d 664 (1942); Lawall v. Groman, 180
Pa. 532, 37 A. 98 (1897).
8 McClenden v. Eubanks, 249 Ala. 170, 30 So.2d 261 (1947) ; Todd v. Rhodes, 108
Kan. 64, 193 P. 894 (1920).
7 Id.
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the full knowledge and consent of both".8 Thus the key phrases are
full disclosure and permission of the parties.
Violation of Legal Ethics
The attorney should strictly adhere to all nine canons of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.9 To be more specific, it appears
that by representing conflicting interests without full disclosure and
permission from the involved parties the attorney will violate or at
least be very close to violating Canons Four, Five, and Six of the
Code.10 Canon Four states that "a lawyer should preserve the con-
fidences and secrets of a client."'1 This is the lawyer-client privilege.
In cases where an attorney is representing adverse interests the
opportunity to break the attorney-client privilege and to use con-
fidential information obtained from one client for the benefit of the
other is greater than in an ordinary case, where the opposing parties
have their own attorneys and is directly opposed to the disciplinary
rules of Canon Four.1 " Under these rules an attorney shall not "use
a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself, or
of a third person, unless the client consents after full disclosure."' 1
Canon Five deals in depth with problems caused by lawyers
representing conflicting interests.14 Under this canon's ethical con-
siderations, EC5-14 stands out as a general statement that crystallizes
the ethical problems of an attorney who has become involved in a
dual representation. It says:
Maintaining the independence of professional judgment
required of a lawyer precludes his acceptance or continuation
of employment that will adversely affect his judgment on be-
half of or dilute his loyalty to a client. This problem arises
whenever a lawyer is asked to represent two or more clients
who may have differing interests, whether such interests
be conflicting, diverse or otherwise discordant.' 5
While this statement very nearly speaks for itself, it is not difficult to
see how an attorney who is representing adverse interests may
find himself hamstrung to the point where everything he does con-
cerning that representation will be colored by how it will affect
his other client.' 6 The attorney in the middle will find strings pulling
him both ways at the same time and may have the strings of self
interest pulling him in a third direction away from the interests and
9 Todd v. Rhodes, 108 Kan. 64, 65, 193 P. 894, 895 (1920).
9 Supra note 1, at Preamble.
10 Id., Canons 4, 5 & 6.
11 Id., Canon 4.
12 Id., DR4-101.
13 Id., DR4-101 (B) (3).
14 Id., Canon 5.
15 Id., ECS-14.
16 Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968) ; Ishmael v. Mil-
lington 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966).
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loyalties owed to the two clients. Because of these conflicting inter-
ests the lawyer may violate Canon Six, A Lawyer Should Represent
a Client Competently.17 It becomes impossible to represent one client
competently when a lawyer is subject to pressures from the other
client or is pursuing his own interests. It is at this point that a lawyer
may find himself facing a malpractice action stemming from his
improper representation of adverse interests.
Elements of the Malpractice Action
- An action for legal malpractice is comprised of the same four
basic elements that make up other damage actions based on negli-
gence. These elements are: (1) a duty owed, (2) a breach of that
duty, (3) being the proximate cause, (4) of the damage sustained.18
More specifically, the elements of the action break down as follows:
an attorney-client relationship satisfies the first element of a duty
owed1 9. Next is the breach of duty which is the improper representa-
tion of an adverse interest. It is not difficult to see that an attorney
who is representing adverse interests will have trouble in maintain-
ing the degree of care owed to his client when he has another client
involved in the same matter to worry about.20 The third element,
proximate cause, corresponds to the legal advice given by the lawyer
which, when accepted and relied upon by the client, leads to and
causes his damage.2 1 It is at this point, after the client has sustained
damages, that he has a viable action for malpractice against the
attorney.22
Cases of Conflict of Interest
At this point it becomes necessary to review and analyze some
of the reported cases dealing with malpractice for the improper
representation of adverse interests. It is necessary to do this in order
to see how the four general elements of a malpractice suit23 break
down into the more narrow, specific questions that must be answered.
Those questions are: (a) Did an attorney-client relationship exist?2 4
17 Supra note 1, Canon 6.
18 Chavez v. Carter, 256 Cal. App. 2d 577, 64 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1967); Ishmael v. Mil-
lington 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966); Modica v. Crist, 129 Cal.
App. 2d 146, 276 P.2d 614 (1955).
19 McGregor v. Wright, 117 Cal. App. 186, 3 P.2d 624 (1931); Lawall v. Groman, 180
Pa. 532, 37 A. 98 (1897).
20 Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968) ; Ishmael v. Mi)-
lington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966) ; Theobald v. Byers, 193
Cal. App. 2d 147, 13 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1961); Babbitt v. Bumpers, 73 Mich. 331, 41
N.W. 417 (1889) ; Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144 (1954) ; Ward v.
Arnold, 52 Wash.2d 581, 328 P.2d 164 (1958).
21 Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App.2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966); McGregor v.
Wright, 117 Cal. App. 186, 3 P.2d 624 (1931).
22 Id.; W. PROSSER, LAW OF TorS 146 (3d ed. 1964).
23 McGregor v. Wright, 117 Cal. App. 186, 3 P.2d 624 (1931); Lawall v. Groman, 180
Pa. 532, 37 A. 98 (1897).
24 Perkins v. West Coast Lumber Co., 129 Cal. 427, 62 P. 57 (1900) ; Lawall v. Groman,
180 Pa. 532, 37 A. 98 (1897).
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(b) What is necessary for an attorney-client relationship to exist?25
(c) What is the nature of the duty the attorney owes to the client?2 6
(d) What is the degree of care owed by the attorney to the client
once the attorney agrees to render legal services? 27 (e) Must the
negligence charged be based upon a specific action?28 (f) Was the
alleged damage sustained as a result of the client's reliance upon
the attorney's legal advice or services? 29 (g) What damages is the
attorney liable for?30
There have been few cases reported involving clients suing
lawyers for damages stemming from the lawyers improperly repre-
senting conflicting interests. There have been many more reported
instances of attorneys being disciplined for improper representation
of adverse interests. There have also been more reported instances
of attorneys being disqualified from representing one or both parties
in order to prevent the improper representation of conflicting
interests.31
In Ishmael v. Millington32 an action stemming from a divorce case,
the defendant attorney had been the husband's lawyer. The parties
to the divorce agreed upon the divorce and the property settlement.
The defendant attorney agreed to the husband's request to act as
the lawyer for the plaintiff wife. The divorce was granted and the
prior property agreement was incorporated into the decree. The
wife received $8,800 as part of her settlement and surrendered her
rights to community assets of $82,500. She claims this came about
as a result of the defendant attorney's negligence in that when the
husband told the attorney that his wife's share was what she was
entitled to under community property laws the attorney took him
at his word and negligently failed to inquire into the true value of
the community property.
The court in this case found that the attorney by accepting the
employment as the wife's lawyer had impliedly agreed to use that
degree of skill, prudence and diligence that lawyers of ordinary skill
25 Id.
28 Grievance Comm. v. Rottner, 152 Conn. 59, 203 A.2d 82 (1964); Smoot v. Lund, 13
Utah 2d 168, 369 P.2d 933 (1962).
27 Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966); Theobald v.
Byers, 193 Cal. App. 2d 147, 13 Cal. Rptr. 864 (1961) ; Olitkowski v. St. Casimir's
Say. & Loan Ass'n., 302 Mich. 303, 4- N.W.2d 664. (1942); National Hollow Brake
Beam Co. v. Bakewell, 224 Mo. 203, 123 S.W. 561 (1909); Hodges v. Carter, 239
N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144 (1954); Ward v. Arnold, 52 Wash.2d 581, 328 P.2d 164
(1958); Leavitt, The fttorney as Defendant, 13 HASTISCS L.J. I at 23 (1961).
's Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966).
29 Id.
8o Id.; Lawall v. Groman, 180 Pa. 532, A. 98 (1897).
31 Author's Note: The reasons for the scarcity of reported cases of legal malpractice
stemming from the improper representation of conflicting interests can only be spec-
ulated about. It is this author's opinion that many malpractice cases are settled out
of court as part of a deal by which the former client agrees not to make a complaint
to the courts or local bar association.
32 Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966).
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and capacity generally have and exercise in rendering their services.
The court held that the negligence charged by the plaintiff did
correctly consist of a negligent failure to act, in that the average
attorney would have checked the actual value of the community
property and would not have relied on the word of an adversely
interested party. The court found that the lawyer's actions came as a
result of his representing the husband and his interests. This follows
from the fact that the attorney did not make an inquiry into the hus-
band's finances, or if he did, then he did not make a full disclosure
to the wife so as to enable her to protect herself. The court said:
an attorney representing two parties with divergent
interests must disclose all facts and circumstances which, in
the judgment of a lawyer of ordinary skill and capacity, are
necessary to enable his client to make free and intelligent de-
cisions regarding the subject matter of the representation. 33
The court continued to emphasize the duty a lawyer owes his client.
It stated:
A lawyer owes undivided loyalty to his client. Minimum
standards of professonal ethics usually permit him to repre-
sent dual interests where full consent and full disclosure
occur. The loyalty he owes one client cannot consume that
owed to the other.3 4
Surely in Ishmael v. Millington 35 the reason the court awarded dam-
ages to the plaintiff was that the defendant attorney's loyalty to the
husband consumed that which he owed to the wife.
In Lawall v. Groman36 the defendant attorney was charged with
negligently overlooking a prior lien on property upon which the
plaintiff had taken a mortgage. The defendant answered that there.
was no improper representation of conflicting interests because there
was no attorney-client relationship established between himself and
the plaintiff. The defendant was acting for the borrower in this
transaction and it was from him that he received his compensation.
Thus, there was an attorney-client relationship established on one
side. On the other side was the plaintiff, the lender. After the plaintiff
had paid the money to the borrower, the defendant kept the mort-
gage, which was the plaintiff's property, and agreed to put it on
record. The plaintiff told the defendant lawyer to search the title
before recording the mortgage and the attorney agreed to do so. It
was at this point that an attorney client relationship came into being
and at the same time the defendant began to represent adverse
interests. He claimed that because he was not to receive compensa-
tion from the lender, but rather from the borrower, there was no
attorney-client relationship established and, therefore, he did not
owe the plaintiff any duty of care and could not be liable for any
3 Id. at 528, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 597.
84 Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 526, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592, 595-6 (1966).
35 Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966).
36 Lawall v. Groman, 180 Pa. 532, 37 A. 98 (1897).
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damages the plaintiff had sustained. The court took a dim view of
the attorney's reasoning. It held that if the defendant undertook to
act for the plaintiff in his professional capacity as an attorney, with
the knowledge that the plaintiff was relying on him to adequately
search title, then the attorney was bound to act with the ordinary
and reasonable care and skill of his profession. The court further
held that it did not matter that he was not to be paid by the plaintiff
for "one who undertakes to do, even without reward, is respon-
sible for misfeasance."37 The court continued to discuss the estab-
lishment of the attorney-client relationship. It held that while the
fee is the most usual and important item in considering whether or
not an attorney-client relationship has been established it is not in-
dispensable. The essential feature of the professional relationship is
the act of employment to do something in the client's behalf. 38 The
court recognized that adverse interests could be properly represented
by one lawyer but "the cases in which this can be done are excep-
tional and never entirely free from danger of conflicting duties."39
In Lysick v. Walcotm,40 the plaintiffs were the survivors of the
deceased victim of an automobile accident caused by the testator,
one Rardin. The attorney, defendant in this action, represented the
estate of the testator in the wrongful death action by way of an
insurance policy. He also represented the insurance company. The
conflict of interests that was alleged was a result of the lawyer
representing the insurer and the insured, the testator's estate in this
case.
41
The plaintiffs were assigned any cause of action which the estate
of Rardin might have against the insurance company and the defen-
dant attorney as a result of the judgment entered against the estate.
Originally the Lysicks brought an action against Rardin's insurer
for $10,000 in death damages. The insurance company offered $9,500.
This was rejected and claims totalling $450,000 were set forth against
the estate coupled with an offer to settle for $12,500. At that point
the estate was willing and able to contribute $2,500 if the insurance
company would contribute the additional $10,000. The insurance
company now employed the defendant attorney to defend the estate
as per the insurance policy. However, neither the insurance company
nor the attorney told the estate of this arrangement. At the same
time as he was named to defend the estate the attorney was author-
ized by the insurance company to offer the $10,000 originally de-
manded, but to do so only at a propitious moment, and then to offer
it with the $2,500 that the estate had agreed to contribute.
37 Id. at 533, 37 A. at 99.
38 Id.
39 Lawall v. Groman, 180 Pa. 532, 37 A. 98 (1897).
40 Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968).
41 Id.
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I At a pre-trial conference a member of the defendant's firm
represented that only $9,500 would be forthcoming from the insur-
ance company when in reality they were authorized to offer the full
$10,000. At this point the estate was made aware of the fact that the
defendant attorney was representing them, as called for in the insur-
ance policy. Soon after the pre-trial conference, the estate's adminis-
trator died and the estate became unwilling and unable to contribute
the $2,500 originally offered. Thus, the last hope of settlement for
$2,500 died with the estate's administrator. The action proceeded
to trial and resulted in a judgment for $225,000 for the Lysicks. The
assignment which made this action possible was then made. This
suit was commenced alleging a bad faith and negligent representation
by the attorney Walcom due to a conflict of interests.
The court, in deciding this case against the attorney, held that he
owed both of his clients, the insured and the insurer, a high duty of
care. It further held that he owed that duty to the insured just as
if the insured had retained him personally. The defendant violated
professional standards of care by not making a full disclosure to
the estate concerning the fact that he was authorized to offer $10,000.
In fact, he represented exactly the opposite as he tried to save the
insurer $500. The court held the attorney liable to the party who was
injured by his lack of disclosure. In this case that party was the
estate and by way of the assignment the Lysicks were able to
recover.
42
Guidelines
In summary, it will be useful to review the seven questions that
should be answered in a legal malpractice action stemming from
an alleged conflict of interests and to present answers to those ques-
tions. Question (a) Did an attorney-client relationship exist?43 An
attorney-client relationship must exist in order for claims of improp-
erly representing adverse interests to be substantiated. 44 Question
(b) What is necessary for an attorney-client relationship to exist?45
It is necessary that the attorney agree to perform professionally for
the client. A fee is not necessary for an attorney-client relationship
to exist.46 Question (c) What is the nature of the duty the attorney
owes to the client? 47 It has been said that the attorney-client rela-
tionship "carries with it a continuing obligation of fidelity and loyal-
ty which disqualifies the attorney from rendering professional
services in the same cause to his client's opponent or from taking
42 Id.
43 Perkins v. West Coast Lumber Co., 129 Cal. 427, 62 P.57 (1900) ; Lawall v. Groman,
180 Pa. 532, 37 A.98 (1897).
44 Id.; Lysick v. Walcom 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968).
45 Perkins v. West Coast Lumber Co., 129 Cal. 427, 62 P.57 (1900) Lawall v. Groman,
180 Pa. 532, 37 A. 98 (1897).
46 Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966) ; Lawall v.
Groman, 180 Pa. 532, 37 A. 98 (1897).
47 Grievance Comm. v. Rottner, 152 Conn. 59, 203, A.2d 82 (1964) ; Smoot v. Lund, 13
Utah 2d 168, 369 P.2d 933 (1962).
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a position hostile to his original client and inimical to the very
interest he originally guarded. '48 Question (d) What is 'the degree
of care owed by the attorney to the client once the attorney agrees
to render legal services? a9 The attorney impliedly agrees to use such
skill, diligence and care as lawyers of ordinary skill, diligence and
care generally possess.50 Question (e) Must the negligence charged be
based upon a specific negligent act?51 It is not necessary for the
negligence charged to be predicated upon a specific act. A failure to
act may result in actionable negligence.52 Question (f) Was the
alleged damage sustained as a result of the client's reliance upon the
attorney's legal advice or services? The damage must be the prox-
imate result of the lawyer's action or inaction.44 Question (g) What
damages is the attorney liable for? 55 The lawyer is liable for the loss
caused by his failure to properly discharge some duty which was
within the purview of his employment. 6
Conclusion
It is extremely desirable for the legal profession to eliminate
instances of malpractice. The practicing attorney should be aware of
the fact that instances where he may properly represent adverse
interests are rare and never entirely free of the dangers inherent
in such situations. The attorney must decide whether or not to risk
a lawsuit for malpractice or disciplinary proceedings for misconduct
whenever he is confronted with a potential conflict of interest situa-
tion. In view of the risks involved, it seems foolhardy to even attempt
representation in such a situation.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to look into every lawyer's dealings
and to advise him so that he may avoid being trapped in a conflict
of interests situation. However, it is not impossible to start at the
beginning, that is with the law school, and to acquaint the student
with situations that he may find once he is a practicing attorney. This
can be done through legal practice clinics and by putting new em-
phasis on attorney-client relations. Hopefully this practical experi-
ence will help to eliminate not only malpractice due to representing
conflicting interests but all forms of legal malpractice.
48 Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966); Theobald v.
Byers, 193 Cal. App. 2d 147, 13 Cal. Rptr. 864- (1961) ; Olitkowski v. St. Casimir's
Say. & Loan Ass'n., 302 Mich. 303, 4. N.W.2d 664 (1942); National Hollow Brake
Beam Co. v. Bakewell, 224 Mo. 203, 123 S.W. 561 (1909) ; Hodges v. Carter, 239
N.C. 517, 80 S.E,2d 144 (1954); Ward v. Arnold, 52 Wash. 2d 581, 328 P.2d 164
(1958) ; Leavitt, The Attorney as Defendant, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1961).
49 Id.
5) Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d 685 (1961); Ishmael v.
Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966); Ward v. Arnold, 52
Wash. 2d 581, 328 P.2d 164 (1958).
51 Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966).
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.; Home Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. Spence, 259 Md. 515, 270 A.2d 820 (1970).
55 Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966) ; Lawall v.
Groman, 180 Pa. 532, 37 A. 98 (1697).
56 Home Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. Spence, 259 Md. 515, 272 A.2d 820 (1970) ; Lawall v.
Groman, 180 Pa. 532, 37 A. 98 (1897).
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